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Abstract
In the ongoing debate on the health of feminism, some authors accuse “second 
wave” feminists, especially European “feminists of difference”, of having weakened fem-
inist claims by abandoning the emancipatory inspiration of “first wave” feminism. “Sec-
ond wave” feminists are also accused of overlooking the importance of the law. If we 
delve deeper, however, their perspective on law appears to represent one of their most 
important legacies. Abandoning it in favor of an acritical enthusiasm for liberal gender 
mainstreaming or a gendered “politics of identity” would be a mistake. Today’s femi-
nists should instead work to adapt this legacy to contemporary challenges.
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Resumen
En el debate en curso sobre la “salud” del feminismo, algunos autores acusan a las(os) 
feministas de la “segunda ola”, especialmente a las(os) “feministas de la diferencia”, de 
haber debilitado los reclamos feministas al abandonar la inspiración emancipadora de 
la “primera ola”. Las(os) feministas de la “segunda ola” también son acusadas(os) de ig-
norar la importancia del derecho. Sin embargo, si se profundiza en ello, su perspectiva 
sobre el derecho parece representar uno de sus más importantes legados. Abandonarlo 
en favor de un entusiasmo acrítico por la corriente principal liberal de género o una 
“política de identidad” de género sería un error. Las(os) feministas de hoy en día debe-
rían trabajar para adaptar este legado a los desafíos contemporáneos.
Palabras clave
Feminismo, teoría legal feminista, neoliberalismo, mujeres.
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Introduction
In the ongoing debate about the health of contemporary feminism1, four main po-
sitions stand out:
1. Some scholars denounce the way conservative and neoliberal policies have target-
ed and sought to dismantle the achievements women made at the end of the 20th centu-
ry. As part of this position, we can distinguish two main approaches to interpreting this 
turn. On the one hand, authors such as Susan Faludi argue that we are facing a backlash 
in which conservative policies deliberately attack women in order to restore the previ-
ous patriarchal gender regime2. On the other hand, theorists such as Angela McRobbie 
observe that neoliberal forces are trying to impose a “new sexual contract”, different 
from the previous patriarchal contract3, through apparently “progressive” policies. In 
McRobbie’s view, the new “career girl” in the affluent West and her counterpart, the 
“global girl” factory worker in developing countries, are constructed as “subjects of ca-
pacity” by a political discourse and popular culture aimed at suppressing the radicalism 
of 20th century feminist movements. Through this new sexual contract, neoliberalism 
obliterates formal politics and civic society, granting priority to economic life4.
2. Many scholars have rejected this dark scenario, however, declaring, as did Sylvia 
Walby in The Future of Feminism, that “feminism is alive and vibrant” even though it is 
less visible than before5. According to this perspective, it now “engages with power and 
with government” and comprises “a very wide range of activities designed to reduce 
gender inequality” developed at local, national and transnational levels6.
1. For a concise analysis of some aspects of this debate, see B. Casalini, “Neoliberalismo e femminismi”, in Jura gentium, 
12, 1, 2015, pp. 31-65.
2. S. Faludi, Backlash. The Undeclared War Against American Women, Crown Publishing Group, New York, 1991.
3. For a discussion of the notion of “sexual contract”, see C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford (Ca.), 1988.
4. A. McRobbie, “Top Girls? Young women and the post-feminist sexual contract”, in Cultural Studies, 21, 4-5, 2007, pp. 718-
737. There are multiple different ways of defining neoliberalism. I use it here in the sense clarified by Laura Bazzicalupo: 
“Neoliberalism is a political rationality, a form of government practiced through self-government”. It “implies an anthro-
pology, a way of conceiving time and the subject, and also an ontology: and it subordinates these conceptual coordinates to 
the goal of governing and social organizing”. At the same time, government can no longer be identified “with the political 
project of the state. Rather, it is conceived as a network of reciprocal influences, of unstable and unequal powers, which find 
a point de capiton (in Lacan’s lexicon), a master signifier […] in the generalization of the economic code”, L. Bazzicalupo, 
“Neoliberalismo e soggettivazioni femminili”, in T. Dini, S. Tarantino (eds.), Femminismo e neoliberalismo. Libertà femmi-
nile versus imprenditoria di sé e precarietà, Natan Edizioni, Benevento, 2014, pp. 38-39 (translated from Italian).
5. S. Walby, “Introduction”, in S. Walby, The Future of Feminism, Polity Press, Cambridge, Malden, 2011, Kindle edition.
6. Ibid.
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3. The third position is similar to the first, but the scholars championing this inter-
pretation develop it in more depth to accuse feminism of having brought about its own 
failure. Their main argument is that feminist claims aided the development of the new 
financial capitalism. Gender experts working for governments and international insti-
tutions such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World Bank con-
tributed, albeit not always intentionally, to this result7. Far from representing the “future 
of feminism”, these “femocrats” issued by the global elite led to the defeat of the feminist 
movement. They helped to eradicate radical feminist claims in the West and developing 
countries, substituting the emancipatory inspiration of first wave feminism8 with top-
down policies of gender mainstreaming aimed at reinforcing neoliberal globalization.
Nancy Fraser has granted this position particular authority through the analysis 
she developed in Fortunes of Feminism, in which she describes the history of late 20th 
century’s feminism as a drama in three acts. In Act One, radical feminism acted in alli-
ance with other progressive forces to struggle for a profound transformation of Western 
androcentric societies. In Act Two, American and European feminists abandoned the 
struggle for redistribution and shifted their attention to cultural politics, making de-
mands for identity policies designed to recognize women’s “sexual difference”. In Act 
Three, still unfolding, feminism should return to its original radicalism, recovering its 
“insurrectionary spirit, while deepening its signature insights: its structural critique 
of capitalism’s androcentrism, its systematic analysis of male domination, and its gen-
der-sensitive revisions of democracy and justice”9.
In Fraser’s opinion, in Act Two feminism was plunged into crisis: “cultural femi-
nists”10 and “deconstructionists”11 failed to understand the consequences of the choice 
they had made. While trying to continue “the earlier project of expanding the political 
7. H. Eisenstein, “A Dangerous Liaison? Feminism and Corporate Globalization”, in Science and Society, 69, 3, 2005, pp. 
487-518, and H. Eisenstein, Feminism Seduced. How Global Elites use women’s labor and ideas to exploit the world, Paradigm 
Publisher, Boulder, London, 2009.
8. As we know, the history of feminism can be represented as a succession of three “waves”: the first by so-called “feminism 
of equality,” which demanded equal treatment for women and men (“liberal feminism” and “socialist feminism” are both 
part of the first wave); the second by European “feminism of difference” (“cultural feminism” in the US) and the “radical 
feminism” of the 1970’s and 1980’s, both of which denounced the epistemic violence of patriarchy (while the “feminism of 
difference” and “cultural feminism” stressed the need to rediscover the value of “sexual difference”, “radical feminism” shed 
light on the existence of a male domain, based on a systematic oppression of women by men); and the third and current 
wave, in which we might identify a “neo-feminism” in which feminist claims meet the neoliberal anthropology, in conceiv-
ing of women’s empowerment as a result of the free play of the market, and a “postmodern” and “queer feminism” aimed 
at deconstructing both male and female gender identity.
9. N. Fraser, “Prologue to a Drama in Three Acts”, in N. Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism. From state-managed capitalism to 
neoliberal crisis, Verso, London, 2013, Kindle edition.
10. Fraser puts American “cultural feminists” and European “feminists of difference” in the same category.
11. Fraser uses this term mainly to refer to French second wave feminism, especially Julia Kristeva, inspired by the work of 
Lacan and Derrida.
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agenda beyond the confines of class redistribution”12, broadening and radicalizing the 
concept of justice, they ended up subordinating social struggles to cultural struggles, 
hence facilitating the rise of the neoliberal regime13. Although Fraser acknowledges the 
good intentions of cultural and deconstructionist feminists, she advises contemporary 
feminists to follow “a third path between Scylla and Charybdis”, joining “other eman-
cipatory movements in integrating our fundamental interest in non-domination with 
protectionists’ legitimate concerns for social security, without neglecting the impor-
tance of negative liberty, usually associated with liberalism”14.
4. In contrast with Fraser’s analysis, some scholars argue that we are facing “a do-
mestication of feminism” since women have failed to take up the radical challenge rep-
resented by the “discovery” of “women’s freedom” on the part of cultural feminists and, 
most of all, European –especially Italian– “feminists of difference”15. This feminist tra-
dition did not focus, as Fraser has asserted, on identity policies. Instead, it developed a 
new politics based on relational action, a politics embodied in women’s experiences and 
anchored in practices, in which practice is not understood as “theory’s younger sister”, 
as “a means subordinate to an end” or as “the concrete verification of an abstract 
ideal”16. From this point of view, rather, practice “is […] a cut in the established so-
cial-symbolic order, a cut that opens a space in which it is possible to publicly act and 
speak of what is repressed, forbidden or disavowed”17. For these authors and activists 
who proudly assert their affiliation with “feminism of difference”, there was no “cultural 
turn” in second wave feminism. “Feminism of difference” revealed the deep structures 
of reality. It did not build any “unholy alliance” with neoliberalism18; rather, it spread an 
awareness of the strategies adopted by neoliberal forces and the way they act first and 
foremost at the symbolic level. It showed that no progress could be achieved without 
working on the structures of knowledge, language and communication19.
12. N. Fraser, “Prologue to a Drama in Three Acts”.
13. See N. Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism, chapters 5 and 6.
14. N. Fraser, “Prologue to a Drama in Three Acts”.
15. On the Italian “Pensiero della differenza”, see Diotima, Il pensiero della differenza sessuale, La Tartaruga, Milano, 1987.
16. I. Dominijanni, “Venus’s Strabismus. Looking at the Crisis of Politics from the Politics of Difference”, in Iris, 2, 3, Firenze 
University Press, Firenze, 2010, p. 171.
17. Ibid.
18. N. Fraser, “Prologue to a Drama in Three Acts”.
19. This argument was developed in T. Dini, S. Tarantino (eds.), Femminismo e neoliberalismo. However, the different essays 
published in the volume admit that the neoliberal anthropology, based on a form of self-entrepreneurship that invests in 
the body and personal desires, has deeply challenged the feminist “discovery” of women’s freedom.
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Some feminists defending this fourth position level severe criticisms at those asking 
for gender equality and balance in gender representation20. They, therefore, appear to 
many contemporary activists and scholars to be defending a sectarian idea of feminism 
based on separatism and a refusal of public engagement. This critique has been exacer-
bated by the historical datum that many “feminists of difference” are part of a specific 
generation of women born at the end of World War II, the so-called baby-boomers. 
White, European, intellectuals, most of them benefited from the social struggles that led 
to the establishment of the welfare state and the women’s inclusion in the labor force 
in the second half of the 20th century. Consequently, they are now accused of being 
“spoiled” and indifferent to the social claims of younger generations who find them-
selves overwhelmed by the advent of the neoliberal “performance society”21.
In the following pages, I focus on the legal domain in order to reveal the partiality of 
the first three positions outlined above and the need to adjust the fourth to meet con-
temporary challenges. The first three positions seem to be driven by the need to develop 
a single causal explanation for current social processes, with inevitably inadequate out-
comes. Neoliberalism is constantly evolving and repositioning itself; hence, we need to 
interpret neoliberal power in Foucauldian terms22, focusing on the relationship between 
power and knowledge instead of looking for a scapegoat. At the same time, it would be 
useless to seek “the definitive solution” by rejecting all alternative paths. A better strate-
gy would consist in taking into consideration all the knowledge, experiences and forms 
of resilience that the different traditions of feminism have been developing over the 
centuries. We need all these tools as well as a willingness to construct large-scale, tempo-
rary alliances between women activists and scholars worldwide if we want to reinforce 
the only resistance feminist movements can mount against the devastating effects of 
neoliberal policies worldwide: that is, the persistent struggle Michel Foucault associated 
with the “practice of freedom”23. In carrying out this task, the legacy of the “feminism of 
difference”, its attention to practice, relational freedom and symbolic order, represents 
a highly important resource.
20. See for example L. Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, Nuova Pratiche Editrice, Parma, 1995.
21. See F. Chicchi, A. Simone, La società della prestazione, Ediesse, Roma, 2017.
22. See in particular M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris, 1975; M. Foucault, Histoire de 
la sexualité, Gallimard, Paris, 1976-1984; M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une archéologie des sciences humaines, Galli-
mard, Paris, 1966, and M. Foucault, Microfisica del potere. Interventi politici, Einaudi, Torino, 1977.
23. See M. Foucault, “Le souci de soi”, in M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité. In this case, I refer to Heller’s interpretation 
of the notions of power and resistance in Foucault (K. J. Heller, “Power, Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault”, in 
SubStance, 25, 1, University of Wisconsin Press, 1996, p. 78-110).
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“Women’s human rights”: a feminist achievement
The 20th century concluded with what many regarded as a significant victory for 
women’s movements at a global level: “women’s human rights” were officially recog-
nized at the Fourth World Conference of the United Nations on women’s rights held 
in Beijing in 1995. This was the first time that international law, having long ignored 
gender differences, was called upon to recognize them fully, not only in terms of prohib-
iting sex discrimination –already included in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights24 and reinforced by the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) –or as a mere gendered specification of 
universal human rights. Beijing marked the implicit acceptance of an assertion central 
to feminist movements: that the human rights system developed primarily by men had 
ignored women’s experiences, neglecting many of the areas in which women’s rights 
are most frequently violated. In particular, this system was based on the historical di-
chotomy between the public and private spheres, focusing on violations committed in 
the public sphere –mostly by state actors– and overlooking violations in the “private” 
sphere, particularly the domestic domain, such as familial abuse and sexual violence.
First at the 1993 Vienna Conference and later in Beijing, the discussion went beyond 
the necessity of focusing the international agenda on “women’s issues” and participants 
decided to grant importance to gender difference, focusing on women’s roles, empower-
ment and living conditions; they also stressed the need to shed light on the various forms 
of women oppression that had previously been overlooked, framed as a form of wide-
spread social habitus. Several assemblies and meetings of NGOs and feminist movements 
from different parts of the world, particularly South America and Africa, prepared and 
accompanied the two conferences, exerting considerable pressure on the development of 
the agenda: “activists at the 1993 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna proclaimed that it was no longer enough that existing human rights mechanisms 
merely be extended to women”25. Women’s rights were to be understood thereafter as 
human rights and gender-based abuses as human rights abuses, an understanding that 
cracked open previous categories to transform prevailing concepts of human rights26.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2.
25. J. Peters, A. Wolper, “Introduction”, in J. Peters, A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s rights human rights. International feminist 
perspectives, Routledge, New York, London, 1995, p. 3. See also E. Friedman, “Women’s Human Rights: The emergence of a 
movement”, in J. Peters, A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s rights human rights, cit., pp. 18-35.
26. See J. Peters, A. Wolper, “Introduction”, in J. Peters, A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s rights human rights, pp. 1-8.
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Thanks to this shift, feminists were able to grant initial visibility to the most frequent 
violations of women’s rights and frame them as human rights violations, making it 
possible, for example, to compare forced prostitution to slavery, rape and women bat-
tery to a form of sexual terrorism that might take the shape of torture, and husbands 
confining their wives to the home to imprisonment27. The aim was not only to make 
manifest gender-based violations; however, it was also to include the gender perspective 
at every level of the UN, within every committee, convention and assembly28. Indeed, 
one outcome of the Beijing conference was the approach that has been defined as “gen-
der mainstreaming”, that is, governments and other institutional actors committing to 
“promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all 
policies and programmes so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the 
effects on women and men, respectively”29.
This important achievement can be seen as the result of discussions, feminist, plural 
and often critical, involving multiple currents30. Additionally, although this final result 
was achieved thanks to the work of an international institution, namely the United Na-
tions, it was the third world critique of international law and insistence on diversity that 
prepared the ground31. This clearly does not mean that the human rights law system has 
changed definitively, nor that it has shed its specifically male character once and for all. 
Despite the breadth of the debate within the UN and among NGOs at the end of the 
20th century, the international approach to gender issues –consecrated by the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action– is still aimed at achieving equality between men 
and women, potentially including the use of positive initiatives which are often modelled 
after those designed for minority groups in pluralist societies. The standard in pursuing 
formal (and, in some cases, substantial) equality continues to be male for the most part.
The focus on equality remains central, primarily because it could be considered 
women’s original approach to law and rights; indeed, it is the pursuit of equality that has 
wagered most heavily on legal reforms to improve the condition of women by rebalanc-
ing the relations between genders. In this sense, first wave feminism coincided with lib-
eral feminism, centred on a notion of equality understood predominantly as sameness.
27. See C. Bunch, “Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective”, in J. Peters, A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s rights 
human rights, pp. 11-17, in particular, pp. 15-16.
28. See E. Friedman, “Women’s Human Rights”, in particular, p. 31.
29. Beijing Platform for Action, p. 202.
30. The Beijing Declaration appears to recognize this legacy by stating that the governments participating in the Fourth 
World Conference on Women acknowledged “the voices of all women everywhere” and took note of “the diversity of 
women and their roles and circumstances, honouring the women who paved the way” (Beijing Declaration, art. 4).
31. See E. Stamatopoulou, “Women’s Rights and the United Nations”, in J. Peters, A. Wolper (eds.), Women’s rights human 
rights, pp. 36-48, in particular, p. 39.
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The centrality of equality is also consistent with the other main tradition of first 
wave feminism, the socialist thread whose legacy continues to shape many international 
policies and, even more so, European projects of gender mainstreaming based on the 
“equal opportunity” paradigm. While the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 
adopted a definition of gender mainstreaming that is quite broad, both the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the European Union subsequently 
developed approaches clearly geared towards achieving equality. However, this concept 
of equality is understood as substantial rather than merely formal32.
In the EU the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam institutionalized gender mainstreaming 
as “an effective political strategy aimed at systematically achieving equal opportunities 
in all EU policies”33. At the same time, however, it can also be understood in a broader 
sense as a principle that:
Addresses in depth the matter of promoting women by raising the issue of a fairer 
allocation of resources and responsibilities, underlining the need to change gen-
eral conditions, roles and/or gender relations, in an effort to change the structural 
conditions that generate forms of discrimination and imbalance; integrating the 
pursuit of equality in all actions34. 
Especially when referencing the experiences of women and the need for structural 
change, this approach appears to have been influenced by another important twenti-
eth-century current of feminism, namely radical feminism aimed at challenging women’s 
oppression and their position of subordination to men in the power relations underlying 
the hetero-patriarchal system35. The late 20th century “rupture” in the system of human 
rights law bears an important trace of this tradition in that it aims at uncovering viola-
tions of women’s human rights that were not previously considered such and adopts the 
principle that “the law should support freedom from systematic subordination because 
of sex rather than freedom to be treated without regard to sex”36. 
32. See ECOSOC, Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997, Economic and Social Council, New York, 1997, p. 27.
33. F. Rescigno, “Il gender mainstreaming europeo e l’approccio internazionale alla questione della parità di genere”, in F. 
Rescigno (ed.), Percorsi di eguaglianza, Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, p. 197. Translated from Italian.
34. Ibid., p. 199.
35. The concept of “hetero-patriarchy” refers to a system of social organization based not only on men oppressing women, 
but also on the imposition of “compulsory heterosexuality” as a social norm that often coincides with legal norms (see M. 
Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other Essays, Beacon Press, Boston, 1992).
36. H. Charlesworth, “What are “Women’s International Human Rights”?”, in D. Otto (ed.), Gender Issues and Human 
Rights, Elgar, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2013, vol. 1, p. 67.
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It is undoubtedly more difficult to recognize in human rights law the move to ac-
knowledge the centrality of women’s social and economic rights. Third world women’s 
movements in Vienna and Beijing clearly expressed the need to broaden the sphere 
of human rights law to include these rights, underlining that women’s human rights 
were particularly at risk due to the fact that women bear “a disproportionate burden 
of the costs of economic globalization” 37, as they are “likely to be required to pick up 
the burden of caring for sick, homeless, or mentally ill family or community members 
when the state divests itself of those responsibilities”38. The Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action focuses on interventions aimed at empowering women’s social and 
economic positions through multiple measures including education. It is clear, however, 
that these rights are not highly effective in the contemporary setting characterised by 
unprecedented levels of social inequality and the transformation of nation-states into 
global economic actors39.
In the political and juridical lexicon of international institutions and the human rights 
protection system, therefore, even in reference to women what prevails is an individu-
alistic approach and emphasis on civil and political rights, both offspring of the liberal 
tradition, at the expense of economic and social rights. Furthermore, there is a persistent 
focus on equality between men and women, which, while taking into consideration sub-
stantial profiles, continues to be based on the male standard. Lastly, we must confront the 
problematic character of human rights universalism, shaped by its ethnocentric origins, 
as well as the still-insufficient attention paid to the different conditions women face in 
different parts of the world, beyond the intentions outlined in Vienna and Beijing. These 
goals should not be considered definitive, therefore, nor should we be too quick to cele-
brate them, viewing gender mainstreaming as the only form through which contempo-
rary feminism can express itself 40. At the same time, however, we must keep in mind that 
this result was achieved through a process that cannot be dismissed as top-down, given 
that it involved important feminist groups representing different traditions of thought.
37. A. Orford, “Contesting Globalization: a Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights”, in D. Otto (ed.), Gender 
Issues and Human Rights, p. 785.
38. Ibid.
39. This was recognized by the United Nations in the Report published by UN Women in 2015 where they make an assess-
ment of the Beijing Platform for Action twenty years after its approval: “In recent years, progress on gender equality has 
been held back by forces in the global political and economic landscapes that have been particularly hard to mitigate or 
combat. Persistent conflicts, the global financial and economic crises, volatile food and energy prices, and climate change 
have intensified inequalities and vulnerability, and have had specific and almost universally negative impacts on women 
and girls” (UN Women, Summary Report. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action turns 20, New York, March, 2015, 
p. 6). 
40. See S. Walby, The Future of Feminism.
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A fissure has been created in the international juridical system and we can make out 
the beginning of a transformation, its traces visible not only in the Programme for Ac-
tion adopted in Vienna and in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, but also 
in the way some International Conventions such as CEDAW have evolved their inter-
pretive frameworks, in the work of international committees and agencies and in some 
subsequent regional Conventions. The Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) is 
an example of this evolution: entering into force in 2014, it adopted a holistic approach 
to gender-based violence that entails taking into account cultural, social and economic 
aspects as well. After all, violence against women more than any other issue highlights 
the need to revise the categories of human rights law, representing as it does “an entry 
point for broadening and reconceptualizing the women’s human rights agenda”41.
Not surprisingly, the discontinuity produced by the Beijing Conference did not go 
unnoticed by feminist thinkers who are highly critical of the emphasis on juridical re-
forms typical of first wave feminism and a part of the North American radical tradition. 
In the highly controversial text È accaduto non per caso, published in January 1996, 
some of the main Italian exponents of the “feminism of difference” gathered in the 
Libreria delle Donne in Milan were driven by the Beijing Conference to announce what 
they interpreted as the “end of patriarchy”: 
Following the Cairo Conference (1994)42, the Huairou Forum43 and the correlated 
Beijing Conference (1995), it has become clear that the end of patriarchy is in-
volving all the countries of the world, a world that is affected, almost suddenly and 
simultaneously, by enormous changes, including the end of patriarchy44. 
And they continue:
During the Huairou Forum, women’s NGOs gathered and spoke of ‘new feminism’. 
This is a good expression for defining the vast network of international and inter-
continental relations that has actually existed since the beginning of feminism but 
which, in Huairou (and before, in Cairo) showed itself more capable of overcoming  
41. E. Friedman, “Women’s Human Rights”, p. 21.
42. International Conference on population and development organized by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).
43. In 1995 the Forum of NGOs was held in Huairou, 50 km from Beijing, concomitantly to the UN Conference. 
44. Libreria delle donne, “È accaduto non per caso”, in sottosopra rosso, gennaio, 1996, available at http://www.libreriadelle-
donne.it/pubblicazioni/e-accaduto-non-per-caso-sottosopra-gennaio-1996/. Translated from Italian.
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disagreements and chasms stemming from (predominantly male) history, such as 
between former colonial countries and formerly colonized ones45.
The Libreria delle donne does not celebrate the consecration of “women’s human 
rights” in official documents, however. They argue that:
It would be wrong to describe as new feminism the aim of making women more 
widely present in the government of the world in the name of female difference 
rather than equality with men. The feminist approach has never exclusively (nor 
predominantly, as far as Italy is concerned) been directed at confronting the male 
condition; rather, it focuses on women’s difference in the broad sense, a difference 
that has been achieved, step by step, by engaging in relations between women and 
not through legislation46.
Therefore, what Italian difference feminists appear to value is the way feminist 
movements have been speaking out at a global level and the web of relationships that 
has been woven over time, made manifest in Huairou and Beijing. They instead con-
demn “the languages of denunciation, claims-making and complaint typical of those 
who take on the various identities domination offers: that of the victim, of the victims’ 
female defender and of the female claimant of universal rights”. In Huairou and Beijing, 
in the middle of a “babel”, the voice of an extraordinary event was heard, “an event that 
hallmarked human history. A voice speaking a common language, a universal language, 
that owed little or nothing to the alleged universalism of rights (which is, in fact, an 
invention of the West) and a great deal to the primacy that was effectively granted to 
relations between women”47.
Hence, the late 20th century “rupture” has involved the convergence of very dif-
ferent and even opposing perspectives. As mentioned above, the struggle to gain rec-
ognition for “women’s human rights”, encompassing groups of women from different 
parts of the world with different skill sets, also reveals the importance of European 
difference feminism and North American “cultural feminism”. Moreover, despite the 
scepticism expressed by the Libreria delle donne, the Beijing emphasis on women’s hu-
man rights that paves the way for making local, regional and international claims is not 
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
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incompatible with a “difference” oriented approach. Indeed, as I will show, although 
this approach rejects the idea that women need to seek recognition through law, it has 
developed a considerable interest in the “practice of the trial”. 
Viewed more than twenty years later, in announcing the end of patriarchy, È accaduto 
non per caso appears inspired by blind enthusiasm. It seems to be a feminist version of 
many texts from that same period written primarily by liberal authors, ready at the 
threshold of the new millennium to celebrate this “new era”. The human rights legal 
system and its global policies of gender mainstreaming, instead, have continued to de-
velop and seem to respond to the strategic need of feminist movements –and, more and 
more, LGBTQI movements as well– to use the global koinè of human rights language 
to: make themselves politically visible, weave transnational alliances and seek access to 
legal human rights protection in order to make up for the failure of politics to represent 
collective and individual claims and respond to the crisis of constitutional states and 
the welfare state.
It appears difficult to deny that, in a world overturned by processes of globalization, 
in which the modern features of democracy and the welfare state have gone missing, 
women must continue to struggle for their rights while invoking a language as contro-
versial and full of ambiguities as that of women’s human rights. That is, they cannot 
ignore what Catharine Mackinnon has defined the consciousness and legitimacy-con-
ferring power of law48 despite being aware of the serious limits of this approach. 
Gaya Chakavroti Spivak has described the Beijing Conference as “a theatre” in which 
white women from the global North co-opted and selected activists from the South to 
represent a union between North and South that was, in reality, simply an act of impe-
rialism49. According to Spivak, it is not possible to separate the work the United Nations 
carries out in the sector of human rights and development from the management of in-
ternational politics and conflicts shaped by consolidated North American hegemony. The 
United Nations, in Spivak’s view, is what Danilo Zolo has defined as a form of cosmo-
political government aimed at maintaining the balance of power established after World 
War II50. Within this framework, the women’s movements that participate in the United 
Nations conferences go along with the charade. What occurs in these conventions has no 
impact on the lives of women in the global South51. This is a radical political criticism that 
48. C. A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Ma.), 1989, p. XIII.
49. G. C. Spivak, “‘Woman’ as Theatre. United Nations Conference on Women, Beijing 1995”, in Radical Philosophy, 75, 
1996, pp. 1-4.
50. D. Zolo, Cosmpolis. Prospects for World Government, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997.
51. G. C. Spivak, “‘Woman’ as Theatre. United Nations Conference on Women”, p. 4.
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certainly hits the mark in denouncing the directions “elitist feminism” can take. In my 
opinion, however, Spivak loses sight of the way law functions as a social practice52, inclu-
ding at the international level, and of the importance of juridical language as a tool that 
individuals, groups, NGOs can deploy through political and jurisdictional claims. 
To criticize the role the United Nations has played in managing international politics 
during the past decades does not necessarily mean rejecting a normative body that is a 
product of multiple contributions, a body that can be resignified from case to case de-
pending on how individuals and social groups reappropriate it. It is an important fact 
that human rights law has become more open to a gendered perspective and more inclu-
sive of difference. Human rights are, nowadays, the language of global claims-making. It 
is the result of a dialectic between dynamism and codification. It has been used ex parte 
principis to justify humanitarian wars, but it is also used ex parte populi53 on a daily basis 
to denounce violence and exploitation against human beings throughout the globe.
As Hillary Charlesworth has declared, “while the acquisition of rights is by no means 
the only solution for the worldwide domination of women by men, it is an important 
tactic in the international arena”54. The “rights discourse offers a recognized vocabulary 
to frame political and social wrongs”55. This does not imply that all is well. Difference 
feminism’s critical considerations can thus shed light on how we might overcome the 
limits of both the liberal perspective regarding human rights and the demanding –and 
sometimes punitive56– posture of a segment of radical feminism, from North America 
in particular. This consideration is highly valuable at the present moment at both inter-
national and national levels in order to ensure that women’s rights not be used as either 
a hegemonic tool or a discursive construction for strengthening the neoliberal order. 
Second wave feminism and the law
Feminist swcholars of the second wave –especially European “feminists of differen-
ce” and American “cultural feminists”– harshly criticized feminist struggles aimed at 
52. See F. Viola, II diritto come pratica sociale, Jaca Book, Milano, 1990. See also E. Santoro, Diritto e diritti: lo Stato di diritto 
nell’era della globalizzazione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2008.
53. See N. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, (1990), Torino, Einaudi, 1997.
54. H. Charlesworth, “What are “Women’s International Human Rights”?”, p. 61.
55. Ibid.
56. Tamar Pitch uses the term “punitive feminism” to define “the increasing number of requests made by women’s move-
ments that clearly refer to feminism to introduce new crimes in the name of safeguarding women’s integrity and dignity” 
(T. Pitch, “Editoriale”, in Studi sulla questione criminale, 2, 2016, p. 7. Translated from Italian). 
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achieving gender equality through law. The Italian feminist Lia Cigarini, a member of 
the Libreria delle donne of Milan, for instance, stated that the law of codes could be 
considered the extreme abstraction of the law of the father; hence, “women should not 
propose the adoption of any bill”57. The radical feminist Carla Lonzi took a similar posi-
tion58. These intellectuals and activists disapproved of Italian women’s movements’ pur-
suing legal reforms –such as the right to abortion– considering the law a means through 
which the state secures its dominion over women’s bodies. Most of them did not sup-
port the law criminalizing rape or the measures aimed at balancing gender representa-
tion in politics and the labor market; they asserted that “women’s freedom” flourished 
in the legislative vacuum, not further legal regulations. Many critics, therefore, viewed 
their positions as inspired by a distrust of the law that reveals a more general distrust 
of the “public sphere”. From this perspective, by criticizing the dichotomy between the 
public and private dimensions and the gendered features of liberal legal systems these 
second wave feminists ended up rejecting political engagement and preferring separat-
ism to politics.
Examining this issue in more depth, however, we must concede that, in different 
ways and from different positions, second wave feminists did engage in feminist legal 
theory. They did not refuse the law, nor did they oppose every legal reform; rather, 
they sought to avoid the neutralization of women’s autonomy and “women’s freedom” 
brought about by state intervention. They engaged in efforts to identify the features of 
a “feminine law”59 and “feminist jurisprudence”60 and set themselves the task of decons-
tructing the legal lexicon and traditional legal tools while rejecting any form of “grand 
theory”61. The overall aim of this work was to insert women’s experiences and practices 
into the heart of legal discourse.
Contextuality, subjectivism and a focus on differences are common to many second 
wave feminist approaches to law, approaches which are based on “the desirability of 
the concrete”62. This is the method of authors such as Robin West, Ann Scales, Fran-
ces Olsen, who can be identified with Feminist Legal Studies, but it is also shared by 
many Italian “feminists of difference”63. Their goal has been to reveal the male-specific 
57. L. Cigarini, “Lo stupro simbolico”, in L. Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, p. 85. Translated from Italian.
58. C. Lonzi, Sputiamo su Hegel e altri scritti, et al., Milano, 2010.
59. See L. Cigarini, “Fonte e principi di un nuovo diritto”, in L. Cigarini, La politica del desiderio, pp. 109-117.
60. See for instance the works of Ann Scales and Catharine MacKinnon.
61. M. Fineman, “Introduction”, in M. Fineman, N. Sweet Thomadsen (eds.), At the Boundaries of Law. Feminism and Legal 
Theory, Routledge, New York, 1991, p. XIII.
62. Ibid., p. XI.
63. See Libreria delle donne di Milano, Non credere di avere dei diritti. La generazione della libertà femminile nell’idea e nelle 
vicende di un gruppo di donne, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino, (1987),1998.
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character of the legal order64, pointing out that women were “included in pieces within 
the legal system”65 and can only be protected by the law as long as there is no outbreak 
of conflict between genders. When such conflict does emerge, as often happens in the 
familial sphere, the labor market or cases of gender-based violence, women immediately 
perceive that the law is protecting them in a patronizing way aimed at controlling their 
bodies, restricting their freedom and reaffirming gender stereotypes66. Consequently, 
second wave feminism, and especially the “feminism of difference”, engaged in legal 
theory and legal politics in an effort to develop a new “law for two”67, considering wom-
en’s difference a universal signifier and approaching women’s law as a field capable of 
producing “universal mediations and universal rules that are valid for both women and 
men”68. From this perspective, women’s freedom to occupy public space takes priority 
over legal rights. These feminists did not refuse public engagement; rather, they sought 
to break down the boundaries between the home and the agora and asserted that wom-
en’s freedom flourishes in the interactions that women are able to create and sexualize, 
e.g. within consciousness-raising groups, in schools and universities and in the social 
services provided by the welfare state. Through these relationships, it is possible for 
women’s freedom to make its way into the domain of law.
We can thus say that second wave feminists criticized a positivist conception of the 
law and adopted –albeit not always explicitly– the perspective and method of legal re-
alism. According to this point of view, “No law can grant value to women’s sexuality if 
this value is not socially recognized”69. Women lawyers and jurists must, therefore, focus 
on the “law in action” in order to open space for “women’s difference” in the practices 
of institutions of all kinds, including courts. To this end, these feminists paid particular 
attention to the trial, viewing it as a “space” in which women might speak up and their 
voices are heard thanks to mediation by female lawyers, judges, and social workers70. 
Viewed in this way, the trial represented an opportunity to carve out a space for wom-
en’s singularities. “Feminists of difference” did not refuse the law and interactions with 
institutions tout court; rather, they warned women against delegating to law the work of 
pursuing liberation that could be carried out only within concrete social relations. 
64. See C. Smart, “The Woman of Legal Discourse”, in Social and Legal Studies, 1, 1992, pp. 29-44.
65. L. Cigarini, “Fonte e principi di un nuovo diritto”, pp. 109-110.
66. Ibid.
67. See T. Pitch, Un diritto per due, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1998.
68. L. Cigarini, “Fonte e principi di un nuovo diritto”, p. 112.
69. Libreria delle donne di Milano, Non credere di avere dei diritti, cit., p. 71. Translated from Italian.
70. For a discussion of the “practice of trial” today, see I. Boiano, Femminismo e processo penale, Ediesse, Roma, 2015.
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A special attention for case law can be found also in the work of radical feminists 
such as Catharine MacKinnon. Indeed, MacKinnon stressed the importance of litiga-
tion and trials for combating women’s oppression, arguing that women’s voices could fi-
nally be heard in the courtroom with the help of female lawyers and activists. Moreover, 
both “feminists of difference” and radical feminists recognized the symbolic value of the 
law71 and engaged in an analysis of legal language, focusing on the ways it contributes to 
constructing the category of “woman”72. These two schools of the second wave thought 
sought to generate a new “legal consciousness”73. Moreover, they did not treat morality 
and the law as two separate systems74 nor did they divide the analysis of the law from 
the politics of law75, instead of employing an explicitly political stance as their point of 
departure. In evaluating the work these feminist scholars carried out, we must keep in 
mind that changing social habitus is a gradual and long-term process, especially in a 
setting where the law has legitimized and institutionalized this habitus.
Conclusion
Neoliberalism tends to reduce women’s freedom to the freedom of consumerist 
choice76. As Foucault clearly showed, its governmentality is, in fact, based on free-
dom77. It invests in a narcissistic promotion of the “individual”, who is expected to use 
his/her own body and sexuality as a form of “human capital”78. Within this framework, 
rights are conceptualized as the assets that comprise an individual’s personal “port-
folio”. Neoliberalism draws on the feminist notion of subjectivity to assert the central 
role-played by desire. The notion of desire it emphasizes, however, is reified79; it is in 
sharp contrast with the “politics of desire” developed by “feminism of difference”, a 
politics understood in Arendt’s terms as “vita activa”80 in which desire is conceived 
71. See for example the works of Cigarini and MacKinnon. I suggested that MacKinnon’s thought has more points in com-
mon with the “feminism of difference” that it is usually recognized in L. Re, “Lo stereotipo della ‘differenza sessuale’. Analisi 
di un fraintendimento in Catharine A. MacKinnon”, in Th. Casadei (ed.), Donne, diritto, diritti. Prospettive del giusfemmi-
nismo, Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, pp. 77-94. See also T. Pitch, “La lettura femminista”, in T. Pitch, I diritti fondamentali: 
differenze culturali, disuguaglianze sociali, differenza sessuale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2004, pp. 61-108.
72. See for example F. E. Olsen (ed), Feminist Legal Theory, Dartmouth, Aldershot, Singapore, Sydney, 1995.
73. A. Ross, On law and Justice, Stevens, London, 1958.
74. See T. Pitch, “La lettura femminista”.
75. See A. Ross, On law and Justice.
76. See B. Casalini, “Neoliberalismo e femminismi”.
77. See M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France. 1977-1978, Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, 2004.
78. See S. Tarantino, “Introduzione”, in T. Dini, S. Tarantino (eds), Femminismo e neoliberalismo, p. 16.
79. See F. Chicchi, A. Simone, La società della prestazione.
80. See L. Cigarini, La politica del desiderio.
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